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Do musical works contain an implied listener? Towards a theory of musical 
listening. 
 
John Butt 
 
When I first agreed to develop a paper along these lines for a recent conference I was 
already aware that it brought with it the substantial dangers of merely producing a string 
of clichés or truisms about music and listening. With hindsight, these dangers have hardly 
receded and I appreciate even more acutely why the entire field of music listenership has 
so often proved slippery.  However, my title contains a degree of obvious cultural charge 
that might help me relate listenership to broader issues and debates: already the term 
‘musical works’ brings in a concept that can hardly any longer be discussed as a neutral, 
transhistorical, category, and the words ‘contain’ and ‘implied’ already evoke the concept 
of a definite ‘container’ and perhaps also a degree of intentionality, somehow inferred as 
part of the work.1
 
Examining the notion of an implied listener in relation to other categories of musical 
discourse brings with it the further danger that the discussion will merely duplicate 
existing debates under another guise. If, for instance, I were to suggest that the listener is 
crucial in rendering certain pieces of music a unity, through a process of necessary 
                                                 
1 The recent literature on the ‘work concept’, and the degree to which it is an historically-conditioned 
category, is extensive. Seminal contributions include, Carl Dahlhaus, Grundlagen der Musikgeschichte 
(1977), trans. J.B. Robinson, as Foundations of Music History (Cambridge, 1983); Lydia Goehr, The 
Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: an Essay in the Philosophy of Music (Oxford, 1992); ‘”On the 
Problems of Dating” or “Looking Backward and Forward with Strohm”’, in Michael Talbot (ed.), The 
Musical Work: Reality or Invention? (Liverpool, 2000), 231-46; Heinz von Loesch, Der Werkbegriff in der 
protestantischen Musiktheorie des 16. Und 17. Jahrhunderts: Ein Mißverständnis (Hildesheim, 2001); 
Harold S. Powers, ‘A Canonical Musuem of Imaginary Music’, Current Musicology, 60-61 (1996), 5-25; 
Reinhard Strohm, ‘Looking Bach at Ourselves: the Problem with the Musical Work-Concept’, in Talbot, 
The Musical Work, 128-52; Walter Wiora, Das musikalische Kunstwerk (Tutzing, 1983). 
concretization (as Gadamer might have said),2 I am not necessarily saying anything 
substantially different from the analyst or performer, who might equally assert that his or 
her insights reveal the work to be a unity. Or, if I merely say that the piece confirms, 
confounds or otherwise modifies the listener’s expectations, is this really substantially 
different from the traditional sort of observation that the piece is predictable, 
unpredictable or pleasingly complex in its manipulation of norms?  My task then will be 
to try and assess the degree to which the issue of the listener brings in dimensions that are 
substantially new or that – perhaps more realistically - at least modify those with which 
we are already familiar. 
 
To start with the most obvious level of truism: we can surely assume that virtually all 
music in the human world presupposes that someone will hear it – otherwise there would 
be no reason, unless very obscure, to create it. An argument may be made that certain 
repertories were designed less for immediate listening than others, or that some forms of 
sacred music – Renaissance polyphony perhaps – might have been partially designed for 
a divine listenership, or at least do not demand that a listener, in the sense of an audience, 
always be present. But, even if this were so, such repertories at least require a performer, 
and performance itself is impossible without a degree of ingrained listening practice. One 
strategy in the philosophy of visual art, developed in particular by Richard Wollheim, is 
to infer a universal human habit of ‘seeing-in’ – in other words, the ability to discern 
representation even in seemingly random, natural arrangements of marks, while, 
crucially, not losing the sense of the physical presence of the marks (otherwise we would 
                                                 
2 See Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode (1960), trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. 
Marshall, as Truth and Method (London and New York, 1989), esp. 328. 
be talking about delusion rather than an essential artistic impulse).3 Obviously, there can 
be no seamless parallel with music here – we are unlikely to discern the representation of 
some sort of object in a sound from nature, at least beyond the realm of onomatopoeia; 
this issue is difficult enough even with cases of actual, humanly created music. But we 
certainly can and do discern patterns, rhythms, gestures and even emotions in non-
musical sounds and can, in an infinite number of cultural ways, transform these into 
music of some kind. I would call this facility ‘hearing-in’ rather than ‘listening-in’ since 
this suggests that it can happen subconsciously, without effort or attention. Moreover, 
once music has been created we habitually experience another level of ‘hearing-in’, 
discerning moods, emotions or personal facets that may parallel the sort of ‘hearing-in’ 
that the music’s creators might have experienced and thus engaged as part of their 
creative activity. But there is never, of course, any certainty that the listener’s ‘hearing-
in’ will directly match that of the creators (a closer match is much more likely in the field 
of representational visual art). It is the fact that we hear things in sounds at all that is 
significant. 
 
I am not sure that the development of a theory of ‘hearing-in’ so far tells us anything we 
didn’t know already, but it does serve to remind us that music is crucially dependent on a 
creative element in the capacity to hear. There is nothing we experience in musical 
listening to parallel the way we can encounter basic truth claims in language, which we 
can normally test in some way, independently of the precise time in which we hear them. 
Rather, we constantly have to assimilate whatever we hear into particular shapes, 
                                                 
3 See Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art (Princeton, 1987), esp. 46-59. Wollheim introduced this 
concept in the second edition of Art and its Objects (New York, 1980), in which he developed ‘seeing-in’ 
as a departure from his original adoption of Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘seeing-as’. 
patterns, resonances and emotions, and we surely do this prior to any specific intentions 
on the part of composers or performers. Indeed, if we fail to do this, there is no chance of 
any intended form of cohesion (or the coherence accorded to ‘the work itself’ by analysts 
of a modernist bent) being intuited whatever. If this creative listening capacity is thus 
prior to any musical act, there would clearly be a constant circulation between the roles of 
composing, performing and listening, and each activity – to the degree that it is separated 
- could be illuminated by renewed consideration of the others.4 A sense of this circulation 
might also be a useful starting-point in comparing the musical practices of different 
cultures or ages: some might afford differing emphases to the compositional, 
performative or listening elements, perhaps even attempting to efface some of them. Even 
the apparent absence of listening considerations in, say, a piece of highly structured 
modernist composition tells us a tremendous amount about the listening practices of its 
context. The notion of ‘hearing-in’ also works for the consideration of the reception of 
pieces of music or performances; different listeners will obviously hear different things in 
such pieces or events, regardless of the specific intentions of the original creators. A 
consideration of the capacity for hearing-in within any particular environment may help 
us to appreciate any elements of the hearing imagination that are not immediately part of 
our own experience.  
 
Surviving repertories might give us some sense of what it was like to be sensorily aware 
at the time of their creation, an idea of the ‘carnal formulae’ by which people of the past, 
or in different parallel cultures, heard their way through life. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for 
                                                 
4 Something along these lines was explored by the American composer, Roger Sessions, in The Musical 
Experience of Composer, Performer, Listener (Princeton, 1950). 
instance, stresses how much humans communicate through gestures that are quite 
different from cognitive operations, and perhaps this sense of gesture could be applied to 
music: ‘The communication or comprehension of gestures comes about through the 
reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others, of my gestures and intentions 
discernible in the conduct of other people. It is as if the other person’s intention inhabited 
my body and mine his.’5 This might suggest then that we could come to imagine quite 
clearly how the gestural implications of music were heard in the past, by taking account 
of their bodily effect on us, and regardless of how little we might be able to relate them to 
specific concepts. Of course, the nature of historical difference will mean that we are 
never likely to intuit exactly the bodily gesture that inhabited the music in the past (or, 
more crucially, even if we were to hit on exactly the ‘right’ gesture, there would be no 
way of distinguishing this from a ‘wrong’ one today). What is surely of primary 
importance is that the music related to some sort of gesture; historical research might then 
predispose us to intuiting some gestures more than others, but this is secondary to the 
sense of a human habitation within the music. Merleau-Ponty lays great stress on how 
physical artefacts are moulded by human action and consequently spread an atmosphere 
of humanity at various levels of determination. Music is, of course, seldom determinate, 
even for its first listeners and creators, but there is surely a way in which even the least 
determinate of music can still summon up for us a sense of human presence. The remote 
cultural world may well be ambiguous, but it is somehow ‘already present’,6 particularly 
if we imagine ourselves to be hearing something for which another’s hearing played so 
vital a part in its creation. 
                                                 
5 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénomenologie de la perception (1945), trans. Colin Smith, as Phenomenology 
of Perception (London and New York, 1958/2002), 215. 
6 Ibid., 405. 
 Can the concept of an ‘implied listener’ be developed beyond this basic sense that some 
form of hearing must always already have taken place, as a component of virtually any 
piece of music we consider in terms of human creativity? I would propose dividing the 
listening aspect of music into three interlocking categories: first, the general hearer-
oriented nature of virtually all music, which I have so far considered. This involves a 
form of hearing, one which would thus not necessarily call for the intentionality or 
involvement suggested by listening. Nevertheless, a more engaged level of hearing is 
certainly not to be excluded, such as when music is used as an aspect of meditation or is 
part of a formal ritual. In these cases, a more concentrated listening would be counter to 
the broader purposes at hand. This sort of musical hearing is that which is most likely to 
be common to a broad range of cultures and historical periods and my remaining 
categories of listening are built upon this as something that is always already in 
operation. My second category concerns the many types of music that are specifically 
listener-oriented – e.g. those which purposely play on listeners’ expectations and which 
are clearly designed with an audience in mind. This is clearly a category that is familiar 
from the way we might already analyse music in terms of its play on our expectations. 
The third type of listening might be more restricted historically (and culturally) and 
somehow relate to the type of listener who creates a specific sense of self over the 
duration of the listening experience. This would thus be something grounded in the time 
of the experience but which somehow overcomes its sole dependence on the linear 
sequence of events. These three modes thus imply a continuum from ‘mere’ hearing 
(contingent on the basic human capacity for ‘hearing-in’) towards listening as an activity 
of consciously mapping the music in time and, finally, one in which the ‘implied listener’ 
might be more specifically determined. Clearly, the third category is crucially dependent 
on the second (as well as the first), so I now need to examine the second category in more 
detail.  
 
Historically, this second type of listening (which I’ll provisionally label ‘roller-coaster’ 
listening) would relate to cultures in which larger, often paying, audiences became the 
norm; it is thus most likely when music has become a commodity, where listeners expect 
to get something out of it. We can assume that playing to the audience’s expectations was 
a crucial element in the invention and development of opera, for instance. Much of the 
effect of opera is to seize the audience, take them forward in the development of action 
and character in such a way that the music serves the immediate dramatic purpose, as 
means to end. If you listen to the music and become engrossed in the stage action, you 
are swept along in the course of events – there is no essential separation between ‘the 
music’ on the one hand, and the listener, on the other. Likewise, if you decide to embark 
on a roller-coaster ride, the experience is one where your body and consciousness become 
part of the ride; it takes some degree of perversity to analyse how the ride is structured, or 
how it might be self referential. To the extent that you become ‘one’ with music (where, 
you might be soothed by its flow or surprised by its shocks and dramatic effects), the 
listening experience is continuously attentive. Much popular music surely works along 
the same basis – the listener is invited to enter into a particular state, or identify directly 
with the performance or performer, and submit to this state for at least the duration of the 
song.  
 So is there any stronger sense of implied listener beyond the sense of being invited to 
map one’s consciousness, and perhaps bodily movements, along whatever lines the music 
might lead us in time? I would suggest that there might be a third, more specialised, type 
of listening presupposed by certain pieces of notated or performed music. This might be 
defined along the lines of an ‘internal’ or ‘implicit listener’, someone latent in the way 
the music seems to have been put together. This category might be much more narrowly 
bounded historically than the other two (although, I would stress, it is crucially dependent 
on both), and it is certainly much more elusive, contentious, and harder to define. While 
this category is clearly tied closely to repertories that place engaged listening at a 
premium, it suggests something rather more than merely the sense that the music might 
play directly to our expectations, with the transformations of state that these may bring. 
This takes us remarkably close to recent discussions of the role of narrative in music: 
namely, that if music is directly modelled on a plot and the events implied by a text it is 
essentially reinforcing a narrative that is already there, as if a sort of mime or the gold 
plating on a statue. Music possesses an independent narrative function only when it does 
something exceptional, something that somehow runs counter to the demands of the 
existing narrative. To quote Carolyn Abbate, it flees ‘from the continuum that embeds 
it’.7 Perhaps the notion of an implied, internal, listener is equally exceptional, something 
working in relief or contradiction to the way the type of music concerned habitually 
draws the listener along. 
 
                                                 
7 Carolyn Abbate, Unsung Voices – Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, 
1991), 29. 
Does the development of the operatic aria perhaps mark the beginning of this third 
concept of the implied listener, given that its musical structuring of time and emotion 
normally runs at a different tempo from the more realistic time of the dramatic narrative? 
Such detachment clearly allows the richest of musical experience and psychological 
insight, as if the dramatic narrative is frozen for a while, so that the situation can be 
explored in more detail. The aria thus offers the listener a type of experience that goes 
beyond merely mapping the flow of the drama or its emotional progress. Nevertheless, I 
would argue that this represents a significant development within the field of listener-
oriented music (my second, ‘roller-coaster’ category) rather than necessarily bringing us 
directly to the concept of the implied listener. The aria presents a particular emotion and 
character within a musical form, a construction that could perhaps profitably be 
compared with the development of perspective, over a century earlier, in the visual arts. 
The gestures, lines of text and musical signatures are heard in relation to a recognisable 
musical form (such as a simple strophic construction or the da capo principle), which acts 
as a predictable frame in musical time. This allows for an ordered presentation of 
contrasts and subsidiary elements, the balance of which is revealed by their place in the 
overall scheme. What the listener gets, then, is a span of musical time in which the 
fleetingness of the narrative moment is suspended, and by which the overall drama 
acquires an increased depth of field. Such musical drama thus begins to imply a 
viewpoint outside itself, although - without more research into the audiences throughout 
the history of the work’s reception - we will not necessarily gain much detailed 
knowledge of the type of person occupying this viewpoint. This music thus implies a 
position of listening without necessarily providing us with the elusive ‘implied listener’ 
(it is, rather, the seat on that roller-coaster, inextricably connected to the machinery of the 
presentation, something pre-given rather than something the passenger is necessarily 
encouraged to create or develop). 
 
In Monteverdi’s Orfeo, the first major opera, the recitative style dominates as a form of 
speech in which every emotion and verbal nuance is amplified by the music; the set 
musical pieces, whether songs or choruses, generally correspond directly to the actual 
singing or playing of the characters and are thus directly part of the represented drama. In 
Monteverdi’s later operas the arias come closer to the more ‘standard’ model I have 
outlined above, originating in the world of the action but distending an emotion or feeling 
from that world towards ours. However, Orfeo does take us directly into the crucial 
debate about the effect of music on its audience, since this originated during an era when 
doubts were cast on music’s direct connection with the passions of the soul.8 The 
prologue of Orfeo introduces the figure of La Musica, conjured up by Striggio and 
Monteverdi, to take us into a world in which there seem - at least initially - to be no 
doubts about the magical powers of music. La Musica’s speech is interspersed with a 
ritornello that we naturally hear as an example of the music about which he is talking (‘I 
am Music, and with sweet melodies, Make peaceful every restless heart…I sing to this, 
my golden lyre, alluring mortal ears so well, That my melodious harmonies Whet their 
desire for heaven’s harps’).9
                                                 
8 Daniel E.L. Chua, ‘Vincenzo Galilei, Modernity and the Division of Nature’, in Music Theory nad 
Natural Order from the Renaissance to the Early Twentieth Century, ed. Suzannah Clark and Alexander 
Rehding (Cambridge, 2001), 17-29. Karol Berger, Bach’s Cycle, Mozart’s Arrow – An Essay on the 
Origins of Musical Modernity (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 2007), 19-42. 
9 ‘Io la musica son ch’ai dolci accenti so far tranquillo ogni turbato core…Io su cetera d’or cantando soglio 
mortal orecchio lusingar ta l’hora e in questa guisa a l’armonia sonora de la lira del ciel piu l’alme 
invoglio’. Translation from the King’s Music edition, ed. Clifford Bartlett (Huntingdon, 1984/1990). 
  
One fascinating musical moment comes when this ritornello from La Musica’s prologue 
provides the close to the tragic second act, after Euridice’s death. Having heard this 
ritornello no less than six times in the context of Music’s prologue, this immediately 
takes the listener back to the opening of the opera and we begin to wonder whether it 
signifies anything in its new place. Does it tell us something about the power of music 
that is yet to enable Orfeo to reclaim happiness? Does Orfeo’s ultimate failure suggest 
that music is somehow of a higher order than the fallible human who masters it, 
something perhaps akin to religion?10 This moment of music’s detachment from its 
generally direct and mimetic role within the drama might point both to the archaic, 
traditional, power of music, but also to a more modern role as something that signifies 
through its very detachment from the immediate action. On the other hand, the same 
ritornello sounds one last time, at the opening of Act V, after Orfeo has lost his lover for 
the second time. Now we might begin wonder whether the ritornello ever had any 
significance at all: perhaps it is a mere framing device, resetting the musical scenery 
(after all, a note in the 1607 libretto suggests the return to the opening scenery at this 
point).11   
 
But, as Act V proceeds, we may begin to think again. At precisely the point where 
Monteverdi departs from the original libretto and interpolates the new ending, which 
involves the arrival of Apollo, he inserts yet another ritornello, one that we have heard 
                                                 
10 A similar point is implied by Berger, Bach’s Cycle, 40-2, when he suggests that the conclusion in 
Monteverdi’s revised version of the original text represents a triumph of the prima over the seconda 
prattica, a confidence in harmony as something that transcends the passions. 
11 See King’s Music edition, 123. 
before. This was in Act III, where it is heard at the introduction to Orfeo’s famous set 
piece ‘Possente spirto’. As we know, Charon does not succumb to the musical charms of 
this song, but when shortly afterwards this same ritornello is repeated, Charon promptly 
falls asleep. Thus it seems that the one piece of music that had any sort of effect in the 
story - albeit soporific - was also suitable for conjuring up Apollo in the modified, 
triumphal ending.  
  
I have been keen to stress that neither of these ritornello returns has a definitive meaning, 
rather that they make us wonder whether they mean anything at all, whether they provide 
some sort of commentary on the nature of music or whether they merely help the opera 
hang together. But if they merely help the opera hang together, why does it need to hang 
together in a musical way (rather than, say, merely reflecting whatever strengths or 
weaknesses the spoken drama might have on its own terms)? The point I am trying to 
develop is that the type of listening experience implied here goes beyond following the 
events and being tied to the flow of the music. It engages the memory of the listener in a 
way that makes one try and make connections and think about the issues raised by the 
opera. Crucially, it does not represent a sort of cipher that is meant to be cracked, since 
that would be something different from the immediate experience of listening. It is the 
very lack of ultimate certainty that makes this case so fascinating, since it conjures up the 
idea of a listener present over a prolonged span, and one who might indeed continue to 
think after the performance has finished. This, then, may come close to my suggestion of 
the stronger sense of implied listener, one who is latent in the way the music is written 
and performed. 
  
My next examples come directly out of the work I am currently undertaking on Bach’s 
Passions. What makes these so relevant for the current discussion is the fact that they 
were designed as part of a broader cultural event in which the listener is directly 
implicated as a participant in worship. Most aspects of Lutheran worship were designed 
to dispose the listener not only to a direct experience of the biblical events, stories or 
doctrines appropriate for the day, but also to make connections and take to heart specific 
lessons learned from Christ’s sacrifice. In short, it is hard to avoid the fact that this music 
had a certain didactic function, one in which the listener was expected to make  specific 
syntheses out of different aspects of the experience. Lutheran salvation required the 
specific cultivation of faith on the part of the individual – a ceaseless change of heart, to 
be renewed on a daily basis; no mechanism of sacraments or even a relentless array of 
good works could be a substitute for this. What is interesting is the fact that Bach seems 
to exploit the listener’s memory in exactly the same way as Monteverdi did in Orfeo. 
Most famously, there are the repetitions of the music first heard with the crowd’s call for 
‘Jesus of Nazareth’ in the opening scene of the John Passion.  
  
Some scholars see later repetitions of this, such as for the words ‘We have no king but 
Caesar’, as revealing a hidden meaning, i.e. that Jesus is the true king of the Jews.12 I am 
profoundly sceptical of the notion of Bach’s music providing such precise theological 
meanings – not least, because if it were proved to have done so, the music would 
somehow have become redundant once the code was cracked. What seems more 
                                                 
12 See Eric Chafe, Tonal Allegory in the Vocal Music of J.S. Bach (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1991), 287-
300. 
significant is the way Bach seems to exercise the listener’s consciousness through the 
manipulation of recurrences. 
 
The later uses of the ‘Jesum von Nazareth’ music interact with other choruses whose 
musical content is itself repeated, as if the recognition of a recent recurrence brings with 
it a memory of something further back. The chorus ‘Wir dürfen niemand töten’ is itself 
an immediate reworking of the first chorus of Part 2 (‘Wäre dieser nicht ein Übeltäter’), 
but ends with the harmonic sequence from ‘Jesum von Nazareth’. Thus there are two 
levels of recollection working simultaneously, that of the chorus just past, which is then 
coupled to that of the very first pair of choruses. As if to balance this sense of pairing, the 
very next turba is ‘Nicht diesen, sondern Barrabam’, which is another complete 
reworking of the ‘Jesum von Nazareth’ music. Husserl might have described this sort of 
overlapping of retentions, running off into one another, as a ‘comet’s tail’ effect in his 
phenomenology of time consciousness.13 The listener might thus develop a doubled sense 
of temporal grounding in the world of the Passion narrative; a conscious memory of a 
recent piece of music (as a ‘constituted temporal object’)14 is combined with the recall of 
a piece that one probably did not realise lay dormant within a sequence of retentions. This 
renders the latter repetitions doubly uncanny, something that could also be related to the 
loosening of strictly linear temporal boundaries, which is characteristic of John’s Gospel 
itself (8:58 ‘before Abraham was, I am’). 
 
                                                 
13 Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (Zur Phänomenologie 
des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, 1893-1917), trans. John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht, 1991) 
14 Ibid., 345-6. 
Considerations of the meaning of time are also a feature of the Matthew Passion. The text 
of the first chorus, with its allusions both to the Song of Songs and to the end times when 
Christ will reign as both bridegroom and lamb on the right hand of the Father, opens up a 
strong sense of temporal expectation. The connection with Revelation is itself anticipated 
in the Gospel text, with Jesus’s first statement in Part 2 (the most substantial of his three 
utterances in this latter part), when he prophesises to the high priests that from now on 
they will see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of the power, coming in the clouds 
of heaven. Jesus sings the word ‘Wolken’ to a figure that begins with a four-note pattern 
(b. 12), which in fact was first introduced in the string parts two bars previously. It would 
be perverse to dispute that this figure is a form of word-painting for ‘clouds’, particularly 
since it has – effectively - been surrounding the singer for several bars already. Yet the 
uninformed listener does not realise this meaning until Jesus’s line explicitly links it with 
the word ‘Wolken’. Here, then, is an example of the music being ahead of what it 
signifies, something which is perhaps of a piece with the forward-leaning nature of this 
Passion as a whole. 
 
Hearing this section with a little fore-knowledge or with a particularly acute awareness of 
where the biblical words lead, this could also be considered an example of the protention 
of the momentary consciousness. Rather than playing on the notion of retention as in 
most of my previous example (Augustine’s present of past things), this is a present of 
future things, a sense of what is just to come in the next immediate moment. In other 
words, this presupposes a listener who is developing a sense of personal consciousness in 
time, extending the pinpoint of the present in both directions. Such a feature of the music 
could be very simply assimilated into a theological expectation of what will happen in the 
much more distant future, but for the purposes of this study it is the idea that the music 
seems tailored to a sense of the listener’s presence that is most significant.  
 
Some of the arias in both passions take this idea of cultivating, or at least implying, an 
active listener even further. The majority of Bach’s arias present the vocal line as vitally 
dependent on the ‘stuff’ of the piece as presented in the instrumental material: some 
adhere closely to this, others deviate in a variety of ways. However, there are some 
instances in which the deviation is more absolute, where the ritornello material seems 
purposely to be ignored in the vocal lines. This seems to be the case with the longest and 
perhaps the most challenging aria to perform in the John Passion, ‘Erwäge, wie sein 
blutgefärbter Rükken’, where the ritornello is so blatantly shaped by the string figuration 
(composed originally for violas d’amore) that the tenor can, at most, only allude to the 
figuration of the opening two beats (b. 5). If this setting of the word ‘Erwäge’ was indeed 
Bach’s first compositional thought (as one would expect for a composer of vocal music), 
he clearly very soon developed it well beyond any vocal considerations.  
But, perhaps, Bach did this purposely to set the tenor slightly away from the essential 
substance of the piece. After all, the text is imploring us to consider how Jesus’s 
bloodstained back is in all aspects like the sky, on which a beautiful rainbow of God’s 
grace remains once the deluge of our sin has abated. Thus, the tenor’s imploring 
‘Erwäge’ (b. 5) encourages us to ‘consider’ the four-bar ritornello that we have just 
heard, but without initially telling us what to consider; not until b. 8 do we get the 
reference to the sky, and not until the B section do we learn of the deluge 
(‘Wasserwogen’, b. 22) or the rainbow (‘Regenbogen’, b. 25).  
  
Thus there is perhaps some sense in having the tenor stand a little apart from this 
emerging picture, we retrospectively focus on the rounded ritornello that continues to lie 
harmonically behind the voice, but from which he seems to step out towards us. And we 
add associations to it as his commentary proceeds (sky, deluge, rainbow). This is surely 
no straightforward symbolism, but, rather, a sophisticated exercise in a pre-modern 
revelation of resemblance: Jesus’s body is like the sky with a rainbow, even if this would 
initially seem absurd; Bach’s four-bar ritornello invention is increasingly revealed to 
embody precisely the same images even if we would never have considered this at the 
outset. It is relatively easy to associate the music with the natural elements, but we are 
encouraged also to sense this as becoming a spiritualized form of Jesus’s body, 
something akin the ‘real presence’ of the Lutheran Eucharist. 
 
As I have stressed already, these examples are not to be taken as evidence that the music 
is some sort of code, but that they seem designed to engage the listener in concretizing a 
sense, one that is played out in time and thus through an expansion in moment-to-
moment consciousness. There is also the sense here of the singer as an intermediary 
between the instrumental music and the listener, thus going beyond the sense of 
perspective that I have already suggested is implied by aria forms in general. This is a 
sort of perspective where the viewing- (or rather listening-) points, both inside and 
outside the music, are occupied by human subjects. We might also gain the sense that the 
notion of the listener assimilated to the flow of the music is rendered more complex: the 
listener can certainly occupy the ‘world’ implied by the instrumental ritornello, or the one 
implied by the singer observing and pointing towards the first, or even one of her own 
brought into being by following the interactions between the first two.  
 
Much of my discussion has been edging towards the notion that the stronger sense of the 
‘implied listener’ is characteristic of a particular period in musical history – the time 
when the development of individual subjectivity was at a premium and when music came 
to be seen as a crucial element in the cultivation of this essentially artificial construct. 
The music plays on our memory and sense of consciousness, developing our awareness 
as conscious beings anxious to develop a personal identity defined by its consistency and 
integrity, enduring beyond whatever is thrown up by the moment. There is a degree of 
necessarily artificiality in this: one uses a cultural tool to enhance one’s sense of 
personhood and unique existence, something crucial in the construction of western 
modernity, but this is by no means the norm for humanity in general. 
 
One might predict that this sense of implied listener became particularly important within 
the later 18th century and early 19th century German concept of music as part of Bildung. 
This sort of developmental aesthetic education was thus primed to translate the religious 
motivations of Bach’s Passion music into this imperative towards personal subjective 
development. The types of temporal and layered listening experiences that I have 
outlined in Monteverdi and Bach are surely amply evident at certain places in music from 
the classical era. Such examples are equally likely to be sporadic and exceptional rather 
than something that can be discerned as a norm of musical procedure. Precisely those 
examples that have recently been cited to demonstrate music’s sporadic narrative 
function also work from the point of view of implied listenership. Beethoven’s 
representation of memory, most obviously the return of the introductory Adagio ‘La 
malinconia’ just before the conclusion of the String Quartet in Bb, Op 18, no. 6, has been 
discussed by Charles Rosen, Lawrence Kramer and Karol Berger.15 The latter suggests 
that Beethoven is the first person to discover the ‘past tense’ in music, by which it 
represents a mind abandoning present concerns for something returning from the past. 
My examples surely imply that the roots of this go rather further back, until at least the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, although it is clearly much more overt in the period 
of Beethoven.  
 
Considering this sort of issue from the standpoint of the listener forces us to think more 
about the specific type of human implied by this sort of music: is it one who is 
recognisable to us, one that we would wish to be, or even one that we cannot help being? 
                                                 
15 Charles Rosen, The Romantic Generation (Cambridge Mass., 1995), 166; Lawrence Kramer, Music as 
Cultural Practice, 1800-1900 (Berkeley and Los Angeles), 190-203; Karol Berger, A Theory of Art (Oxford 
and New York, 2000), 179. 
Like all good stories, this one of the implied or internal listener eventually begins to 
disintegrate, or at least is rendered more problematic, the longer it lasts. For instance, 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, while incipient musical modernism might 
continue play upon listeners’ expectations as much as any other music, and indeed set up 
levels of conscious recollection, more often than not much of the ultimate effect is 
towards the alienation rather than cultivation of the listener. Just as I have tended to focus 
on those cases where the sense of an implied listener was in the ascendant, those where it 
is on the decline (or at least becoming problematic are perhaps the most telling). In other 
words, some pieces seem to preserve the notion of exercising the listener’s self-
awareness while ultimately leaving the listener disoriented.  
 
While analysts tend to look for coherence and unity in Bruckner’s symphonies, this 
approach tends to ignore some of the sense of shock the listener surely experiences, at 
least in certain instances. The opening of the Fifth Symphony begins unusually, for 
Bruckner, with the slow introduction that had been one major strategy for the classical 
symphonist. Traditionally, the slow introduction might introduce us to a world of 
seriousness or profundity that the main ‘stuff’ of the first movement dispels or redefines. 
What we have, in effect, is the sense of the main discourse of the music as lying within a 
frame, which the listener enters from outside, in the introduction.16 The listener might use 
the memory of one initial world (‘outside the frame’) to inform the experience of the 
                                                 
16 See Berger, A Theory of Art, 181-2, for the suggestion that, like paintings, music can have an internal 
frame, thus separating its discourse into one outside and one inside the frame. 
‘plot’ of the symphonic process within it. The opening of the fifth symphony is unusual 
though, because the introduction sounds so much like historical quotation (had Bruckner 
played Bach’s chorale prelude on ‘Nun komm, der Heiden Heiland’, perhaps?). It is not a 
typical element of his symphonic world, perhaps a frame borrowed from elsewhere; and 
it seems to run out of steam before long, by no means setting up anything that is to 
follow.  
 
Next follows a sequence of fanfares in a seemingly unrelated tonality (beginning in Gb to 
the initial Bb), almost Stravinskian in their starkness and unorthodox voice leading. If 
we’ve been prepared to accept one section of this music as lying outside the frame, what 
are we to do with this second one? And then there follows the third unrelated element, an 
expectant pedal on A and thus nowhere near the opening tonality, but now in a much 
more familiar symphonic style that eventually leads us into the ‘first subject’ proper. But 
this itself begins as if as a parenthesis, initially in Gb, and thus again largely outside the 
primary tonality. In other words, one is entirely disorientated as to the point at which we 
join the symphonic world; and when the first subject actually appears we might even be 
wondering whether we missed its start. There is a feeling that it has somehow been going 
on already without our having caught its beginning, since it is already modulating quite 
widely, as if developing a theme that has already been announced with some degree of 
stability. All of this is, I think, something more than the case of a piece of music 
constantly thwarting our expectations, since we are never quite sure where the ‘normal’ 
music really lies, against which our expectations are to be dashed. It is almost as if the 
‘implied listener’ is defined in a negative sense. Of course, the traditional analyst might 
still claim that all these ambiguities are eventually sorted out in the work’s massive 
progress and that all the elements conspire towards a grand synthesis at the end. But, at 
least from a listening perspective, this is as much wishful thinking as musical reality; it is 
perfectly open for the listener to claim that he hears the work satisfactorily resolved, but 
this is really an act of faith, the belief that one’s earlier disorientation was merely a 
temporary aberration.  
 
To draw all this together, I have proposed that there are three levels in which we can 
consider the listening element of music as a composed and performed artefact. First, there 
is the notion that all music is the product of a fundamental human capacity to hear, both 
unconsciously and consciously, harnessed in countless ways by diverse cultures. The 
listening experiences informing and inflecting the music as it was created could provide a 
focus for analysis and criticism contrasting with those methods traditionally employed. 
Secondly, there is the type of music, covering very broad historical and cultural 
boundaries, that presupposes an attentive listening or even participating audience, and 
that is tailored to the active experience of listening to music; this is the simplest and most 
familiar category. Finally, there is the stronger sense of the ‘implied listener’ which I 
suggest is much more elusive, with specific historical and cultural boundaries within 
western modernity, and which is discernible more in the exceptions than in the ‘normal’ 
progress of the music. While this sense of the implied listener – someone developing the 
sense of a secure and unitary self over time - is perfectly understandable today (assuming 
I have understood it correctly) and might well still be employed in a broad range of new 
music in our own age, I would suggest that it now reflects only one way of being human 
among an alarming array of choices. Discerning or realising an implied listener should 
certainly not become the norm for all ‘good’ listening or the ideal by which all music 
should be measured. Indeed, it is surely time to acknowledge that the type of music we 
tend to associate with the canon of Western classical music is an historical construct 
through and through, and relates to a specific range of subjectivities that are equally 
contingent.  On the other hand, historical constructs should not be abandoned simply 
because they are historical rather than universal, but their survival and regeneration 
requires constant thought and effort. 
 
 
 
